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Abstract 
 
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA’s) history is built on a foundation 
of can-do strength, while pointing to the Saturn/Apollo Moon missions in the 1960s and 1970s as 
its apex — a sentiment that often overshadows the potential that lies ahead. The chronicle of 
America’s civil space agenda is scattered with programs that got off to good starts with adequate 
resources and vocal political support but that never made it past a certain milestone review, 
General Accountability Office report, or Congressional budget appropriation. Over the decades 
since the fielding of the Space Shuttle in the early 1980s, a start-stop-restart cycle has intervened 
due to many forces. Despite this impediment, the workforce has delivered engineering feats such 
as the International Space Station and numerous Shuttle and science missions, which reflect a 
trend in the early days of the Exploration Age that called for massive infrastructure and matching 
capital allocations. In the new millennium, the aerospace industry must respond to transforming 
economic climates, the public will, national agendas, and international possibilities relative to 
scientific exploration beyond Earth’s orbit. Two pressing issues — workforce transition and 
mission success — are intertwined. As this paper will address, U.S. aerospace must confront 
related workforce development and industrial base issues head on to take space exploration to the 
next level. This paper also will formulate specific strategies to equip space engineers to move 
beyond the seemingly constant start-stop-restart mentality to plan and execute flight projects that 
actually fly.  
 
In general, U.S. aerospace entities face the same workforce development challenges — from 
pending retirements to a lack of new hires. Many mid-career employees have never flown 
hardware or operated an experiment in space, which are rewards that motivate personnel, 
wherever they are on their career paths. This paper surveys the current aerospace environment 
and posits potential solutions to the ever-present recruitment and retention challenge by 
equipping the industry as a whole to weather and break the start-stop-restart cycle to which it has 
been continually subjected to over the last few decades. To retain the top-quality engineers who 
form the backbone of the nation’s aerospace capability, it is critical that strategic plans be 
followed with demonstrable action. It is also vital that the government reduce the time to market 
by delivering incremental products to its stakeholders, rather than an all-or-nothing approach. 
The recent Ares I-X mission in October 2009 is a prime example of the power of testing to train 
the workforce, generate technical data from real-world flight profiles, and deliver visible value to 
stakeholders, while blazing a path forward toward getting to first flight. 
 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20100040541 2019-08-30T13:31:02+00:00Z
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I. Introduction 
In general, U.S. aerospace entities face the same workforce development challenges — from pending 
retirements to a lack of new hires. The study “Launching the 21st Century American Aerospace Workforce” states: 
“The generation of aerospace talent that won the Space Race and the Cold War is reaching retirement age, and 
America is not producing the number and quality of engineers, designers and technicians needed to even begin 
replacing those who have served so well.”1 This is such a risk that it is clearly addressed in the Civil Space 
Guidelines in the National Space Policy released June 2010.2  
Many mid-career employees have never had the opportunity to fly hardware or operate an experiment in space, 
which are rewards that motivate personnel, wherever they are on their career paths. This paper surveys the current 
aerospace environment and posits potential solutions to the ever-present recruitment and retention challenge by 
equipping the industry as a whole to weather and break the start-stop-restart cycle to which it has been continually 
subjected over the last few decades.  
To retain the top-quality engineers who form the backbone of the nation’s aerospace capability, it is critical that 
strategic plans be followed with demonstrable action. It is also vital that the government reduce the time to market 
by delivering incremental products to its stakeholders, rather than an all-or-nothing approach. The recent Ares I-X 
mission in October 2009 is a prime example of the power of testing to train the workforce, generate technical data 
from real-world flight profiles, and deliver visible value to stakeholders, while blazing a path forward toward getting 
to first flight (Figure 1). 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The Ares I-X flight demonstration was conducted in October 2009. 
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II. Mantras and Missions 
Throughout America’s 50 years of space flight, the aerospace community has been motivated by, and subjected 
to, mantras that range the full spectrum of advice — from the 1960s action cry “Failure is not an option!” (Figure 2) 
to the less-than-optimum business battle cry of “faster-better-cheaper” in the 1990s, and back to “mission success” 
after the Mars Climate Orbiter and Mars Polar Lander failures. Discriminating between the testing-to-understand 
activities during the design and development phase — with some expected failures as part of the process — versus 
validating the system in later phases, has become somewhat of a lost art.  
 
 
          Figure 2. Apollo mission control. 
 
While there have been numerous successes, too many to enumerate, it is the catastrophic failures that get the 
most attention and live within the collective consciousness of space engineers in the private and commercial sectors. 
The tragic losses of the Challenger and Columbia Shuttles and their valiant crews affect every safety decision and 
make progress slowly measured and painstakingly tracked. To be clear, when dealing with human safety, failure is 
not an option. Conversely, when developing a new space transportation system, testing to failure is often the best or 
only way to validate the analytical math models on which space engineers rely. Planning programmatic content to 
effectively play on these realities is one method to equip aerospace engineers to recognize that the start-stop-restart 
cycle is political in nature and to break the mental model that masks real progress despite the pantheon of program 
and project names. 
This philosophical whipsaw effect, in combination with tragic social and political losses, has caused both the 
programmatic and institutional climate to avoid taking the risks that come with doing things that have never been 
done before. Although failures cannot be built into a budget, they naturally occur whether accounted for or not. 
Managing content such that reserves are available when the inevitable happens is a risk-reduction strategy that can 
help aerospace engineers analyze failures instead of declaring defeat.  
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For scientific spacecraft and propulsion and transportation technology research and developments, the 
landscape is littered with the lessons taught by the 1998 Mars Climate Orbiter, which failed because of basic human 
error and lack of communication about technical standards, to the 1995 vintage X-33 flight demonstrator vehicle, 
which pushed the farthest boundaries of composite tank technologies (Figure 3) in a risky bid to field a single-stage-
to-orbit reusable launch vehicle. During the 2001–04 Space Launch Initiative (SLI) Program, the Space Shuttle was 
set for fundamental upgrades and improvements conducted in parallel with designing a new space transportation 
architecture and investing in long-lead enabling technologies, but those efforts were cut when SLI was cancelled in 
favor of the Orbital Space Plane and Next Generation Launch Technologies programs — both later cancelled when 
the Exploration Systems Architecture Study evolved into the Constellation Program, which is now being debated in 
the U.S. Congressional appropriations process.3 
 
 
     
Figure 3. NASA concept of the X-33 flight demonstration vehicle. 
 
When faced with such obstacles and the seeming setbacks that naturally come with new starts, the wheels of 
progress slow down, allowing budget issues and politics to make costly course corrections that too often result in 
derailed efforts. That is not to say that the lessons are not worthwhile, but it is difficult to grow a tree when digging 
up the seed on a regular basis. In a climate of shrinking budgets and timelines, risk management has become a 
survival tactic and the only variable in a continually changing business model. We can find a thousand reasons why 
to point a finger and at whom, but looking in the mirror, at our own reflection, is the most revealing view. Why have 
we allowed the political climate to make us risk adverse? How can we realize a new space transportation system’s 
first flight if we cannot find it within ourselves to learn that the art of engineering a complex system is about the art 
of compromise, about accepting and communicating risk relative to high-performance systems? These cultural 
norms are as important to equipping the aerospace engineer to break the start-stop-restart cycle as is political will. 
When surveying the private space industry today, it is a tempting prospect to join their ranks and make things 
happen in quick time (Figure 4). Saturn V architect and the first Director of the Marshall Space Flight Center Dr. 
Werner Von Braun said repeatedly, getting hands-on experience and finding out firsthand what makes things tick, 
especially in the high-stakes world of propulsion systems, is essential to understanding how things work.4 
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Dr. von Braun also encouraged and rewarded the healthy face-to-face debates that ferret out problems and lead 
to solid engineering solutions to stakeholder requirements that often become moving targets. NASA’s 50 years of 
experience with highly complex systems, from the Saturn V to the Space Shuttle to the International Space Station, 
has formed a fantastic platform of knowledge about living and operating in space. The trick is to selectively apply 
only the relevant data and not all the bells and whistles that consume performance margins and management 
reserves. Perhaps organizations with decades of history can position for future exploration breakthroughs by 
learning from their counterparts’ agility and the innovative climate they routinely offer their employees. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. The Space X Falcon 9 inaugural launch in June 2010. 
 
The question is how to unburden the mental model that has been created, to minimize the ever-growing set of 
constraints, hurdles, and attitudes that blocks us from completing what we begin, to realize the fruits of our labor. 
The Engineering Directorate at NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center serves as a microcosm for observations and 
applying simple approaches to retraining a risk-averse culture created from too many electronic tools and channels 
(noise in the system), too little direct communication (blogs, e-mail, Twitter, Facebook, etc.), and too many 
processes (regulations, specifications, procedures, etc.) that may stifle innovation. Helpful conveniences and 
thoughtful regulations should not hinder the engineering practice but, rather, unleash the potential within the 
professional workforce equipped to break through self-imposed limitations that are compounded by the start-stop-
restart cycle. 
 
III. Learning to Fail: The Art of Engineering 
Sustainable space exploration is a new mantra that applies not only to hardware and software, but to the 
workforce that makes America’s aerospace industry the powerhouse it has become over the last 50 years. The very 
act of starting-stopping-restarting drains energy from the minds and hands of those who deliver the space missions 
that make this discussion possible. The art of systems engineering, combined with the science of systems 
management, are two methods to correctly characterize technical requirements and to scope the task. They also 
create a foundation for organizational communication. 
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Planning programmatic content to deliver incremental value will go a long way toward sustainability, but 
getting to first flight is almost as hard as escaping the “gravity well” to get to orbit. The talented technical people 
who devote their careers to this pursuit depend on managers to make wise decisions based on realistic data and with 
cognizance of the political and budgetary constraints. Too often, they become entrapped by these forces, which are 
out of their hands, and retreat to analyzing data rather than keeping their hands dirty, reflecting a risk-averse culture 
that may have trouble executing a program that is fully funded with a definite goal and timeline and budget to 
match. As stated in an article on Innovation in Aerospace and Defense, “What needs to happen is that industry 
stakeholders must undergo—or again, perhaps simply rediscover—a cultural shift from ‘risk-averse’ to ‘risk-aware.’ 
Risk-awareness involves understanding and evaluating risk as thoroughly as possible and then minimizing it by the 
choice of appropriate tools and approaches. Most importantly, risk-awareness means a commitment to accept risk 
once the measures to mitigate and minimize it have been established and implemented.”5 
Ultimately, it is each individual’s responsibility to communicate with team members, to articulate the workings 
of complex, high-performance systems. It is the individual’s technical and interpersonal competencies, combined 
with a willingness to compromise, which make the team’s technical products reliable and affordable, despite factors 
that are beyond immediate control. We must learn to trust and respect one another, and the roles we each serve, to 
find effective solutions. Applying these principles to aerospace programs and projects will be a major step toward 
breaking the cycle that affects not only the progress we demonstrate, but the decisions that engineers make relative 
to their chosen field. Managers can do only so much — it is up to the workforce to deliver. The caveat is that 
mangers often over-promise, setting up the workforce to under-deliver. This is not the win-win situation that 
everyone involved deserves. 
In space transportation, performance is king and engineers, by their very nature, are a community of improvers, 
which collectively stretches schedules and budgets. Today’s reality requires us to shift to a schedule-is-king 
approach, not add risk and schedule associated with trade studies to get performance improvements. Engineering is a 
team sport that is played on multiple fields. While converting the office infrastructure from paper to digital data, the 
conversation often revolved around information technology tools. Over the past 5 years, Marshall’s Engineering 
Directorate has put in place an extensive digital space transportation system enterprise. Organizationally, a network 
of Chief Engineers is in place throughout the program and project customers, from small technology development 
satellites and payloads, to full-blown science racks and air and water recycling capabilities for the International 
Space Station (Figure 5). But these management related conventions only go so far to help workers accept a 
reasonable level of risk, which is essential to pushing the edges of physics, as well as continually surveying existing 
systems for anomalous signals. Beyond listening to the hardware and software, we must learn to listen to each other, 
to respect the other team members’ opinions and the functions they serve. This team norm is best taught through 
example. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. The International Space Station is an engineering feat. 
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IV. Communicating the Engineering Continuum 
The workforce has continued to deliver excellent products and services on time and within budget, but it is 
often the case that the start-stop-restart cycle will prevail. Personnel hear excessive noise in the system, often 
believing what they see and hear in the media is more valid than what they hear and see around them. They are over-
processed, meaning they get so much information — it is hard to distinguish what is important. The tools often 
impede face-to-face communication — body language and other non-verbal cues from real-time interactions are 
invaluable. 
This underscores the importance of regular and persistent communication as a key strategy in ways that allow 
for two-way feedback. Employee surveys point to the fact that they want to hear news from their team leads and 
supervisors. Setting that expectation for leads and supervisors is the job of management. The Engineering 
Directorate’s leadership is graded on the basis of performance plans, which reflect the expectations of NASA 
leadership at the Headquarters level. NASA’s education and outreach communication goals could be the subject of a 
separate paper; for this purpose, internal communication is one channel for mitigating the risk of getting to first 
flight. This is a powerful phrase that evokes a long, hard road through programmatic and technical battles and 
breakthroughs. 
Probably the single most important strategy is communication, but what do we communicate? Recent 
experiences with the second President Bush’s exploration initiative, the Constellation Program which is now being 
debated in the Congressional FY11 budget process, leads us to the next strategy, and that is to create a sense of 
continuity from one political administration to the next by focusing on the underlying work.  
Engineering can be hurried — but only to a point. The one-of-a-kind hardware and software systems that 
aerospace engineers produce take time to grow from an idea to an innovation. The prototypical products that the 
space program demands require intense effort. Giving these employees a sense of continuity across political lines 
will help aerospace engineers feel successful, despite the many changes to which they are their work are subjected. 
This strategy, in turn, should increase job satisfaction, while somewhat mitigating the morale risk that comes with 
terminating a major undertaking.  
There are many examples of this phenomenon, where an effort that was begun for one project winds up in 
another one altogether. Unless attention is paid and these uplifting, and grounding, stories are told in a consistent 
manner, the successes that take place in the span of a career, and others that pass on from one generation to the next, 
may be lost. This strategy requires that managers make story-telling a valued team norm as a way to focus on 
individual and collective successes rather than on setbacks and cancellations. It places importance on risk 
management by sharing lessons lived and learning from our unique set of experiences. 
One example can be found in the story of the RS-68 engine that flies today on the Delta IV evolved expendable 
launch vehicle (EELV) — a U.S. Air Force (USAF) asset. Billed as the largest hydrogen-fueled engine in the world, 
its roots trace to the National Launch System (NLS) in the 1990s. NLS, as a subset of the first President Bush’s 
Space Exploration Initiative, was focused on developing a follow on to the Space Shuttle, with a cost-effective 
footprint that could benefit both NASA and the USAF. NLS included the Advanced Launch System (ALS), to 
develop the first liquid fueled U.S. engine since the Space Shuttle Main Engine decades earlier. Throughout the 
course of the NLS/ALS, the high payoff Space Transportation Main Engine (STME) was the focus for Earth orbit 
rendezvous and future missions to Mars.6 Figures of merit included simplicity of design and affordable production 
and maintenance costs. 
This made a lot of sense, especially to NASA engineers and their industry partners, many of whom were 
directly involved in the SSME design, development, testing, and operation/maintenance. By the time the 
Republicans left office and President Clinton moved in, the NLS Program was cancelled in 1992 and replaced in 
1994 with the Access to Space Study and the Reusable Launch Vehicle Program in the mid-1990s, with its X-33 and 
X-34 flight demonstrator projects.7,8  
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Despite the fact that STME hardware had actually been tested, the political climate changed; however, that 
engine, which was to have been human-rated to carry crews, became the foundation for the USAF’s RS-68, which 
began launching satellite delivery missions in 2002 (Figure 6). The expendable RS-68 delivers 650k lb thrust at sea 
level and a specific impulse of 410 isp, and has been true to its heritage, with simplified manufacturing and 80 
percent fewer parts than the reusable SSME.9 
 
Figure 6. STME to RS-68 engine evolution. 
While there are numerous other examples, the fact is that consistently communicating continuity is a strategy 
that can be implemented in a number of ways without losing sight of the politics that rightly shape America’s space 
agenda. An excellent example of effective organizational communication is that evidenced by Dr. von Braun. An 
academic study of his methods contained in “Organizational Communication Imperatives: Lessons of the Space 
Program” provides many recipes for communicating well and often across a broad range of workers. It documents 
his “keep your hands dirty” philosophy to rocket building and puts the role of systems engineer into sharp focus.10 
In Marshall Engineering and across NASA, a network of Chief Engineers serves to integrate a broad spectrum 
of work. Chief Engineers are embedded throughout the programs and projects served by the Engineering 
Directorate, which is a matrixed organization, to integrate technical solutions on time and within budget. Chief 
Engineers, who are on par with project managers, are responsible for integrating more than hardware and software 
— they serve as a communications conduit from the front lines of design and development to the rear echelon of 
accountability reporting. The Chief Engineers and discipline-based communities of practice are two well-known 
means to communicate both formally and informally. 
As mentioned earlier, another way to prepare the workforce to get to first flight is to plan realistic programmatic 
content that delivers measurable and meaningful milestones as a way to give value to stakeholders, while grounding 
aerospace engineers in incremental successes. By adding to the catalog of space transportation technologies, 
engineers get a sense of accomplishment. This is paramount to the very survival of engineering over the long run; 
employers must be competitive, as today’s junior engineer has global options, and opportunities to hire are 
infrequent.  
Equipping space engineers to break the cycle of start-stop-restart is paramount to taking space exploration 
beyond Earth orbit, stimulating technologies, economies, and imaginations. Creating a learning culture, where the 
creativity that comes from discovering solutions to the challenges of space flight, is the goal of Marshall 
Engineering’s leadership. Helping the workforce to confidently apply technical capability and credibility, and 
grapple with the reality that there is more than one right answer to most questions/problems, are hard lessons to 
teach … and to learn. Consistently communicating continuity through a robust oral history and plain old personal 
dialogue is the ultimate strategy to equip aerospace engineers to create new habits while breaking the bonds of 
programmatic dogma. 
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Conclusion 
The U.S. aerospace industry is threatened by a number of external forces, from changing governmental 
priorities to cheaper foreign labor. Current space plans are creating an environment for entrepreneurial interests to 
have a larger market share, delivering cargo to the Space Station, for example, while NASA heads the design of a 
new heavy lift launch vehicle that can reopen the human exploration of space beyond Earth orbit (Figure 7). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. NASA concept of Mars exploration. 
 
The keys to success include learning the art of engineering a system, compromise, and accepting and 
communicating risk relative to complex, high-performance systems. Developing engineers who are confident risk 
takers and who are able to supplant ambiguous programmatic goals with hands-on technical experience, is no less 
than the task at hand, especially for those who have been subjected to the constant change of the last few decades. 
As the Space Shuttle retires in 2011, bringing not just lessons, but knowledge and experience to bear, is a key risk-
reduction strategy. Breaking the start-stop-restart cycle is not just a political challenge, but a personal growth 
opportunity, especially when coupled the understanding that work done in the past is an important part of building 
the foundation for America’s future in space. 
 10 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
 
   
References 
 
1. Launching the 21st Century American Aerospace Workforce, Aerospace Industries Association, December 
2008. 
2. National Space Policy, www.ostp.gov, June 28, 2008. 
3. Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS), Final Report, NASA TM-2005-214062, November 2005. 
4. Tompkins, Phillip, Organizational Communication Imperatives: Lessons from the Space Program, 
Roxbury Publishing Company, 1992. 
5. Rivers, Charles, “Innovation in Aerospace and Defense,” Charles Rivers & Associate, October 28, 2009. 
6. The Road to Ares V – A short history, www.Spacelaunchreport.com/sdv.html 
7. Heuther, Jacob, et al., “Space Shuttle to Reusable Launch Vehicle,” 1995, 
http://science.ksc.nasa.gov/shuttle/rlvhq10.htm 
8. Wood, Byron, “Propulsion for the 21st Century — RS-68,” 38th Joint Liquid Propulsion Conference, July 
2002. 
9. Andrews Space and Technology, RS-68 Summary, 
www.spaceandtech.com/spacedata/engines/rs68_sum.shtml 
10. Tompkins, Organizational Communication Imperatives. 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
www.nasa.gov 
Getting to First Flight:  
Equipping Space Engineers to Break  
the Start-Stop-Restart Cycle 
Agenda 
•  NASA: Why America Explores Space 
•  Marshall Space Flight Center Capabilities 
•  Marshall Engineering  
•  The Workforce Environment 
•  NASA Programs are Tied to Administration Cycles 
•  Consistently Communicate the Engineering Continuum  
•  Plan Programmatic Content to Deliver Incremental Capability 
•  Communicate Significant Accomplishments 
•  Mission Success Requires Talent and Tenacity 
2 5-472749 
NASA: Why America Explores Space 
Opening New Frontiers 
5-472749 3 
Economic Expansion 
Exploration Preparation 
Human Civilization Scientific Knowledge 
Global Partnerships 
Public Engagement 
Marshall Space Flight Center Capabilities 
Contributing to America’s Space Agenda 
5-472749 4 
Marshall Engineering  
Expertise for Scientific Space Exploration 
5-472749 5 
The Workforce Environment 
Need the Next Generation of Engineers for a New Age of Exploration 
5-472749 6 
5% 
4% 
3% 
2% 
1% 
0% 
NASA Workforce (FTP FTE) 
U.S. Workforce (College Educated) 
Millennial           Generation X     Baby Boomers            
22
 
24
 
26
 
28
 
30
 
32
 
34
 
36
 
38
 
40
 
42
 
44
 
46
 
48
 
50
 
52
 
54
 
56
 
58
 
60
 
62
 
64
 
66
 
68
 
70
 
AGE 
PE
R
C
EN
TA
G
E 
O
F 
W
O
R
K
FO
R
C
E 
The NASA Age Distribution Contrasted With the U.S. Workforce (2008) 
NASA Programs are Tied to Administration Cycles 
Direction and Redirection Come Every 4 to 8 Years 
5-472749 7 
Consistently Communicate the Engineering Continuum  
Technical Successes Transcend the Start-Stop-Restart Cycles 
5-472749 8 
1980   1990   2000   2010 
Fastrac 
X-33 
RS68 
Merlin Engine 
J-2X 
STME 
Dec. 6, 1998 
July 
12, 2
001 
Feb 19, 2010 
Plan Programmatic Content to Deliver Incremental Capability 
Engineering Takes Time and Patience … and Compromise 
5-472749 9 
Ares I-X Test Flight 
FASTSAT 
Robotic 
Lander Te
stbed 
Communicate Significant Accomplishments 
Focus the Workforce on Successes 
5-472749 10 
Space Shuttle 
Mission Success Requires Talent and Tenacity 
Space Engineering is the Work of Generations 
5-472749 11 
A
m
ba
ss
ad
or
_S
T
D 
12 
For more information: 
www.nasa.gov 
5-472749 
